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Abstract
This paper studies whether conformism behavior aﬀects individual outcomes in crime.
We present a social network model of peer eﬀects with ex-ante heterogeneous agents and
show how conformism and deterrence aﬀect criminal activities. We then bring the model
to the data by using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. A novel
social network-based empirical strategy allows us to identify peer eﬀects for diﬀerent types
of crimes. We find that conformity plays an important role for all crimes, especially for
petty crimes. This suggests that, for juvenile crime, an eﬀective policy should not only be
measured by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it
engenders.
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1

Introduction

A large literature has developed on the general causes of, and the impact of public policy
on, crime. Yet, no consensus has emerged on quite basic issues, such as, for example, the
eﬀects of incentives, both positive and negative, on crime.
Juvenile crime is an important aspect of this debate. According to the U.S. Department
of Justice, juveniles were involved in 16 percent of all violent arrests and 32 percent of
all property crime arrests in 1999. In addition, more than 100,000 juveniles are held in
residential placement on any given day in the United States. However, despite these figures
there are still many unanswered questions about juvenile crime. Some have shown that
deterrence has a negative impact on juvenile crime (Levitt, 1998; Mocan and Rees, 2005). It
has also been shown that crime committed by younger people have higher degrees of social
interactions (Glaeser et al., 1996; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008).1
There is indeed a growing literature in economics suggesting that peer eﬀects are very
strong in criminal decisions. Case and Katz (1991), using data from the 1989 NBER survey
of youths living in low-income Boston neighborhoods, find that the behaviors of neighborhood peers appear to substantially aﬀect criminal activities of youth behaviors. They find
that the direct eﬀect of moving a youth with given family and personal characteristics to a
neighborhood where 10 percent more of the youths are involved in crime than in his or her
initial neighborhood is to raise the probability the youth will become involved in crime by
2.3 percent. Ludwig et al. (2001) and Kling et al. (2005) explore this last result by using
data from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment that relocates families from highto low-poverty neighborhoods. They find that this policy reduces juvenile arrests for violent
oﬀences by 30 to 50 percent for the control group. This also suggests very strong social
interactions in crime behaviors. Patacchini and Zenou (2008) test the role of weak ties2 in
explaining criminal activities, revealing that weak ties have a statistically significant and
positive eﬀect on both the probability to commit crime and on its level. Finally, Bayer et al.
(2009) consider the influence that juvenile oﬀenders serving time in the same correctional
facility have on each other’s subsequent criminal behavior. They find strong evidence of peer
eﬀects in criminal activities since exposure to peers with a history of committing a particular
1

In the crime literature, the positive correlation between self-reported delinquency and the number of
delinquent friends reported by adolescents has proven to be among the strongest and one of the most
consistently reported findings (see e.g. War, 1996, 2002; Matsueda and Anderson, 1998; Haynie, 2001).
2
Weak ties are defined in terms of lack of overlap in personal networks between any two agents; i.e. weak
ties refer to a network of acquaintances who are less likely to be socially involved with one another (see, in
particular, Granovetter, 1973).

2

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper448

2

Patacchini and Zenou: Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism

crime increases the probability that an individual who has already committed the same type
of crime recidivates with that crime.
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the role of conformism in juvenile crime
using a network perspective. There are two important challenges in the empirics of social
interactions: (i) the assessment of the existence of the endogenous eﬀect of peers; (ii) the
explanation of how peers influence each other, i.e. the mechanism generating such social
interactions.3
We first present a social network model where individual utility depends on conformism.
Conformism is the idea that the easiest and hence best life is attained by doing one’s very
best to blend in with one’s surroundings, and to do nothing eccentric or out of the ordinary
in any way. It may well be best expressed in the old saying, “When in Rome, do as the
Romans do”. To be more specific, using an explicit network analysis,4 we develop a model
where conformism5 associated with deterrence are the key determinants of criminal activities.
Our model is as follows. Each criminal belongs to a group of best friends and derives utility
from exerting crime eﬀort. We have a standard costs/benefits structure a la Becker with
an added element, conformism. The new aspect of this model is that the social norm is
endogenous and depends on the structure of the network. Indeed, direct friends define a
social norm and depending of the location in the network, each individual has a diﬀerent
reference group. The utility function is such that each individual wants to minimize the
social distance between his/her crime level and that of his/her reference group.
We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game and obtain that, when individuals are ex
ante heterogenous (for example diﬀerent race, sex, parents’ education, etc.), they provide
eﬀort proportional to that of their reference group of best friends and that deterrence reduces
crime.6 An interesting result is that, when individuals are ex ante identical, i.e. diﬀer only
3

See, in particular, the special issue on peer eﬀects in the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Durlauf and
Moﬃtt, 2003).
4
There is a growing literature on networks in economics. See the recent literature surveys by Goyal (2007)
and Jackson (2007, 2008).
5
In economics, diﬀerent aspects of conformism and social norms have been explored from a theoretical
point of view. To name a few, (i) peer pressures and partnerships (Kandel and Lazear 1992) where peer
pressure arises when individuals deviate from a well-established group norm, e.g., individuals are penalized
for working less than the group norm, (ii) religion (Iannaccone 1992, Berman 2000) since praying is much
more satisfying the more average participants there are, (iii) social status and social distance (Akerlof 1980,
1997, Bernheim 1994, Battu et al., 2007, among others) where deviations from the social norm (average
action) imply a loss of reputation and status.
6
In this model, we assume that benefits of crime always outweigh the costs. In the case of ex ante
heterogeneities, one could have a two-stage game, where in the first stage people decide to become criminal
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by their location in the network, then, in equilibrium, all agents provide the same eﬀort level.
In other words, the Bonacich centrality index7 is the same for all individuals in the network.
This is a surprising result since Ballester et al. (2006), using a similar social network model
but without conformism, find that, when individuals are ex ante identical, each of them will
provide a diﬀerent eﬀort level depending on his/her location in the network (as measured
by his/her Bonacich index). Our result is due to the fact that the cost of deviating from
the norm is suﬃciently high so that individuals behave identically in equilibrium. However,
when an additional heterogeneity is introduced (apart from the location of the network,
individuals are heterogenous in their ability of committing crime, which is correlated with
their idiosyncratic characteristics), individuals deviate from the social norm and behave
partly according to their ability.
Even quite diﬀerent, this theoretical model is along the lines of the growing literature on
the social aspects of crime. In Sah (1991), the social setting aﬀects the individual perception
of the costs of crime, and is thus conducive to a higher or a lower sense of impunity. In
Glaeser et al. (1996), criminal interconnections act as a social multiplier on aggregate crime.
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004), Ballester et al. (2006), and Ballester et al. (2010) develop
social network models of pure peer eﬀects and no conformism.8,9
We then test our model using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health
(AddHealth), which contains unique detailed information on friendship relationships among
delinquent teenagers. Empirical tests of models of social interactions are quite problematic
because of well-known issues that render the identification and measurement of peer eﬀects
quite diﬃcult: (i) reflection, which is a particular case of simultaneity (Manski, 1993) and (ii)
endogeneity, which may arise for both peer self-selection and unobserved common (group)
correlated eﬀects.
or not and then, in the second stage, only those who decide to be criminal (i.e. all individuals for which
the benefits of crime are lower than the costs) will be embedded in a network. This will not aﬀect the main
results since we will work on a subset of people who are criminals. This is because, in our utility function,
only criminals aﬀect other criminals, which means that for non-criminals, the social network does not play
any role.
7
To be more precise, the Bonacich centrality measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends
of each individual but puts less weight to distant friends.
8
The diﬀerence between our present model and these three models are discussed in detail at the end of
Section 2.2 below.
9
Linking social interactions with crime has also been done in dynamic general equilibrium models (İmrohoroğlu et al., 2000, and Lochner 2004) and in search-theoretic frameworks (Burdett et al., 2003, 2004, and
Huang et al., 2004). Other related contributions on the social aspects of crime include Silverman (2004),
Verdier and Zenou (2004), Calvó-Armengol et al. (2007), Ferrer (2009).
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In this paper, we exploit the architecture of social networks to overcome this set of
problems and to achieve the identification of endogenous peer eﬀects. More specifically,
in social networks, each agent has a diﬀerent peer-group, i.e. diﬀerent friends with whom
each teenager directly interacts. This feature of social networks guarantees the presence of
excluded friends from the reference group (peer-group) of each agent, which are however
included in the reference group of his/her best (direct) friends. This identification strategy
is similar in spirit to the one used in the standard simultaneous equation model, where at
least one exogenous variable needs to be excluded from each equation. In addition, because
we observe individuals over networks, we can use a specification of the empirical model
with a network-specific component. By doing so, we are able to control for the presence
of network-specific unobserved factors aﬀecting both individual and peer behaviors. Such
factors might be important omitted variables driving the sorting of agents into networks
or eﬀects arising from unobservable shocks that aﬀect the network as a whole. Such an
approach proves also useful to tackle one further empirical concern stemming from the fact
that each agent’s peer group (rather than the whole network) might be aﬀected by common unobservable factors. Indeed, once our particularly large information on individual
(observed) variables and network characteristics are taken into account, (within network)
linking decisions appear uncorrelated with peer group-level observables. Finally, the variety
of questions in the AddHealth questionnaire allows us to find observable proxies for typically
unobserved individual characteristics that are commonly believed to induce self-selection
(ability, leadership propensity, parental care etc.). The addition of school dummies is used
to control for school-specific inputs.
Observe that school-dummies also account for diﬀerences in the strictness of anti-crime
regulations across schools as well as for local crime policies. The identification of deterrence
eﬀects on crime is a diﬃcult empirical exercise because of the well-known potential simultaneity and reverse causality issues (Levitt, 1997), which cannot totally be solved using our
network-based approach. We avoid to directly estimate such eﬀects (i.e. to include in the
model specification observable measures of deterrence, such as local police expenditures or
the arrest rate in the local area). Rather, we focus our attention on the estimation of peer
eﬀects on crime, once deterrence eﬀects have been controlled for.
This strategy leads to the following main findings: conformity plays an important role
in explaining criminal behavior of adolescents, especially for petty crimes. Specifically, a
one-standard deviation increase in individual i’s taste for conformity or equivalently in the
average criminal activity of individual i’s reference group raises individual i’s level of crime
by about 5.2 percent of a standard deviation when total crime is considered. It ranges from
5
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9.8 to 1.4 moving from petty crimes to more serious crimes.
The analysis of peer eﬀects is, however, a complex issue and our analysis has obviously
some limitations. Firstly, our model is only one of the possible mechanisms generating such
externalities. It is not, however, rejected by our data and highlight the importance of network
topology in explaining criminal activities. Secondly, in absence of experimental data, one
can never be sure to have captured all the behavioral intricacies that lead individuals to
associate with others. Nevertheless, by using both within- and between-network variation
and by taking advantage of the unusually large information on teenagers’ behavior provided
by our dataset, our analysis is one of the best attempts to overcome the empirical diﬃculties.
The rest of the paper can be described as followed. In the next section, we derive our
main theoretical results. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy. In Section
4, we present our empirical results, both for all crimes and for each type of crime. Section 5
checks the sensitivity of our results when the actual directions of the friendship nominations
are exploited. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2
2.1

Theory
The basic model

There are N individuals/criminals in the economy.
The network N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of agents. The n−square adjacency matrix
G of a network g keeps track of the direct connections in this network. Here, two players i and
j are directly connected (i.e. best friends) in g if and only if gij = 1, and gij = 0, otherwise.
Given that friendship is a reciprocal relationship, we set gij = gji .10 We also set gii = 0.
The set of individual i’s best friends (direct connections) is: Ni (g) = {j 6= i | gij = 1}, which
P
is of size gi (i.e. gi = nj=1 gij is the number of direct links of individual i). This means
in particular that, if i and j are best friends, then in general Ni (g) 6= Nj (g) unless the
graph/network is complete (i.e. each individual is friend with everybody in the network).
This also implies that groups of friends may overlap if individuals have common best friends.
To summarize, the reference group of each individual i is Ni (g), i.e. the set of his/her best
friends, which does not include him/herself.
Let γ ij = gij /gi , for i 6= j, and set γ ii = 0. By construction, 0 ≤ γ ij ≤ 1. Note that
10

This is not an important assumption since all our theoretical results hold even when gij 6= gji . We
discuss this issue in Section 5.
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γ is a row-normalization of the initial friendship network g, as illustrated in the following
example, where G and Γ are the adjacency matrices of, respectively, g and γ.
Example 1 Consider the following friendship network g:
t

t

2

Then,

⎤
0 1 1
⎥
⎢
G=⎣ 1 0 0 ⎦
1 0 0
⎡

t

1

and

3

⎤
0 1/2 1/2
⎥
⎢
Γ=⎣ 1 0
0 ⎦
1 0
0
⎡

Preferences We focus on adolescent crime and we denote by ei (g) the crime eﬀort
level of criminal i in network g. We also denote by ei (g) the average crime eﬀort of the gi
best friends of i, which is given by:
ei (g) =

j=n
1X
gij ej
gi j=1

(1)

From now on, when there is no risk of confusion, we drop the argument g. Each individual/criminal selects an eﬀort ei ≥ 0 and obtains a payoﬀ u(ei , ei ) given by the following
utility function11 :
ui (ei , ei ) = a + bi ei − p ei f − c e2i − d (ei − ei )2
(2)
with a, c, d > 0, and bi > 0 for all i.
This utility has a standard cost/benefit structure (as in Becker, 1968). The proceeds
from crime are given by a + bi ei and are increasing in own eﬀort ei . There is an ex ante
idiosyncratic heterogeneity, bi , which captures the fact that individuals diﬀer in their ability
(or productivity) of committing crime. Indeed, for a given eﬀort level ei , the higher bi , the
higher the productivity and thus the higher the booty a + bi ei . Observe that bi is assumed
to be deterministic, perfectly observable by all individuals in the network and corresponds
to the observable characteristics of individual i (like e.g. sex, race, age, parental education,
etc.) and to the observable average characteristics of individual i’s best friends, i.e. average
level of parental education of i’s friends, etc. (contextual eﬀects). To be more precise, bi can
be written as:
11

Crime eﬀort ei could mean diﬀerent things, but here ei is the frequency of crime rather than actually
taking the time to plan and not get caught. This is why the assumption that the probability of being caught
is increasing with eﬀort makes sense in the utility function.

7
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bi (x) =

M
X

β m xm
i +

m=1

xm
i

n
M
1 XX
θm gij xm
j
gi m=1 j=1

(3)

where
is a set of M variables accounting for observable diﬀerences in individual, neighborhood and school characteristics of individual i, and β m , θm are parameters. This form is
only adopted for the ease of the empirical implementation.
The costs of committing crime are captured by the probability to be caught p ei , which
increases with own eﬀort ei , as the apprehension probability increases with one’s involvement
in crime, times the fine f , i.e. the severity of the punishment. Also, as it now quite standard
(see e.g. Verdier and Zenou, 2004; Conley and Wang, 2006), individuals have a moral cost
of committing crime equal to c e2i , which is reflected here by their degree of honesty c.12 So
the higher c, the higher the moral cost and it increases with crime eﬀort.
Finally, the new element in this utility function is the last term d (ei − ei )2 , which reflects
the influence of friends’ behavior on own action. It is such that each individual wants to
minimize the social distance between him/herself and his/her reference group, where d is the
parameter describing the taste for conformity. Indeed, the individual loses utility d(ei − ei )2
from failing to conform to others. This is the standard way economists have been modelling
conformity (see, among others, Akerlof, 1980, Bernheim, 1994, Kandel and Lazear, 1992,
Akerlof, 1997, Fershtman and Weiss, 1998). We can analyze the bilateral influences of this
utility function. They are given by:
⎧
⎪ −2 (c + d) < 0, when i = j
∂ 2 ui (ei , ei ) ⎨
=
.
0, when i 6= j and gij = 0
⎪
∂ei ∂ej
⎩
2d > 0, when i 6= j and gij = 1

Since, when i 6= j, 2d > 0, an increase in eﬀort from j triggers an upward shift in i’s response
and thus eﬀorts are strategic complements from i’s perspective within the pair (i, j).
Observe that beyond the idiosyncratic heterogeneity, bi , there is a second type of heterogeneity, referred to as peer heterogeneity, which captures the diﬀerences between individuals
due to network eﬀects. Here it means that individuals have diﬀerent types of friends and
thus diﬀerent reference groups ei . As a result, the social norm each individual i faces is
endogenous and depends on his/her location in the network as well as the structure of the
network. Indeed, in a star-shaped network (as the one described in Figure 1) where each
individual is at most distance 2 from each other, the value of the social norm will be very
diﬀerent than a circle network, where the distance between individuals can be very large.
12

Assuming diﬀerent degrees of honesty ci does not change our results.

8
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2.2

A simple symmetric case

In this section, we assume that, ex ante, all individuals/criminals are identical, i.e. same ex
ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity, so that bi = b.13 This of course does not mean that they
have the same peer heterogeneity since individuals have diﬀerent reference groups.
We can calculate the Nash equilibrium of this game where each individual chooses ei by
taking as given the actions of the other players. We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume that bi = b and b > p f. Then, the conformity game with payoﬀs
(2) has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, which is given by:
e∗i = e∗i =

b − pf
2c

(4)

In particular, the higher the deterrence, the lower the crime level.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
This is an interesting result. It says that, even if individuals are ex ante heterogeneous
because of their location in the network and thus have diﬀerent reference groups and social
norms (peer heterogeneity), in a conformist equilibrium where each individual would like
to conform as much as possible to the norm of his/her reference group, all individuals will
exert the same eﬀort level. The equilibrium eﬀort e∗i is increasing in the booty b, decreasing
in the deterrence p f and in the disutility of committing crime c. In other words, ex ante
heterogeneity and the distribution (in particular the variance) of population do not matter
in a conformist equilibrium even if it does ex ante. It is really the average that plays a crucial
role in this model. This contrasts with the results of Ballester et al. (2006)14 who find that,
when the utility function has not this conformism component, ex ante heterogenous agents
are ex post heterogenous in terms of outcomes.
Let us explain in more detail why in this model the location in the network does not
matter for equilibrium eﬀort while it does in Ballester et al. (2006).
The model of Ballester et al. (2006) is the so-called local aggregate model where peer
(social network) eﬀects enter in the utility function as follows:
ui (ei , g) = a + bi ei − p ei f −
|
{z
own concavity

13
14

c e2i

}

+

d

n
X

gij ei ej

(5)

j=1
local aggregate peer eﬀects

We relax these assumptions in the next section.
and also Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2004) and Ballester et al. (2010).
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P
It is thus the sum of the eﬀorts of his/her peers, i.e. nj=1 gij ei ej , that aﬀects the utility of
individual i. So the more delinquent i has criminal friends and the more active they are, the
higher is his/her utility. On the contrary, in the so-called local-average model (our model),
the utility function is given by (2). In that case, it is the deviation from the average of the
eﬀorts of his/her peers that aﬀects the utility of individual i. So the closer is i’s eﬀort from
the average of his/her friends’ eﬀorts, the higher is his/her utility.
Consequently, the two models are quite diﬀerent. From a pure technical point of view,
the adjacency matrix G of direct links of the initial network totally characterizes the peer
eﬀects in the local aggregate model whereas it is a transformation of this matrix G to a
weighted stochastic matrix Γ that characterizes the peer eﬀects in the local-average model.
Given these two aspects, the result of Proposition 1 is not that surprising. Indeed, in both
models, it has been shown that the Nash equilibrium eﬀort of each individual is proportional
to his/her (Bonacich) centrality in the network (Ballester et al., 2006). In the local aggregate
model, even if individuals are ex ante identical (i.e. same own concavity), their position
in the network is diﬀerent, which means that their (Bonacich) centrality is also diﬀerent.
Since the latter is basically characterized by the matrix G,15 then each individual will exert
a diﬀerent eﬀort since he/she has a diﬀerent position in the network. On the contrary, in
the local-average model, if individuals are ex ante identical and even if their position in the
network is diﬀerent, their (Bonacich) centrality will be the same because it is defined by the
matrix Γ and not by G, where Γ is a row normalization matrix of G.16 From an economic
viewpoint, in the local aggregate model, diﬀerent positions in the network imply diﬀerent
eﬀort levels because it is the sum of eﬀorts that matter whereas in the local-average model,
the position in the network does not matter since it is the deviation from the average eﬀort
of friends that aﬀects the utility.
15

To be more precise, the vector of Bonacich centralities in the local aggregate model η lag (φ, g) is given

by:
η

lag

(φ, g) =

+∞
X

φk Gk 1

k=0

where 1 is a vector of one.
16
To be more precise, the vector of Bonacich centralities in the local average model η lav (φ, γ) is given by:
ηlav (φ, γ) =

+∞
X

φk Γk 1

k=0

=

1
1
1−φ

where the second equality is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix 1.

10
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Take for example the star-shaped network with 3 individuals in Example 1. In the local
aggregate model, individual 1 will exert the highest eﬀort since he/she has two direct friends
and will thus receive high local complementarities, given by e2 + e3 , whereas the two other
individuals has only one friend and each will only receive e1 . In the local-average model,
£
¡
¢¤2
3
this is not anymore true since the peer eﬀect component of individual 1 is − e1 − e2 +e
2
¡
¡
¢2
¢2
whereas, for individuals 2 and 3, we have: − e2 − e21 and − e3 − e21 , respectively. The
diﬀerences in the direct links are already small and, in equilibrium, where both direct and
indirect links are taken into account (through the Bonacich centralities), these peer-eﬀect
aspects turn out to be the same for all individuals in the network.

2.3

The general model

Let us generalize this theoretical model for the case of ex ante heterogenous individuals in
terms of bi . We have the following result:
Proposition 2 Consider the general case when all individuals have ex ante idiosyncratic
and peer heterogeneities, and diﬀerent tastes for conformity. Assume that bi > p f for all i.
Then, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium where each individual i provides the following
crime eﬀort:
pf
d
bi
−
,
ei +
c+d
2 (c + d) 2 (c + d)
µ
¶ X
j=n
d
1
pf
bi
=
−
,
gij ej +
c + d gi j=1
2 (c + d) 2 (c + d)

e∗i =

(6)

which is increasing with the average crime eﬀort of the reference group ei ,
∂e∗i
>0
∂ei

(7)

Furthermore, for a given ei , this equilibrium crime eﬀort e∗i is increasing with ex ante heterogeneity bi and decreasing with deterrence pf,
∂e∗i
∂e∗i
<0
> 0 and
∂bi
∂pf

(8)

while its relationship with the taste for conformity d is ambiguous since
∂e∗i
bi − p f
R 0 ⇔ ei R
∂d
2c

(9)

11
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Proof. See Appendix 1.
The previous result of Proposition 1 does not hold anymore since there are now both
idiosyncratic and peer heterogeneities. We find that individuals will provide criminal eﬀort
proportional to their reference group ei (see (7)) and to their ex ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity bi (see (8)). Also, deterrence p f will negatively aﬀect the crime eﬀort (see (8)).
Thus, not surprisingly, Proposition 2 shows that the only Nash equilibrium is asymmetric
since each individual provides diﬀerent crime eﬀorts. Furthermore, the eﬀect of the taste
for conformity d on equilibrium crime eﬀort e∗i is ambiguous because there are two opposite
eﬀects. On the one hand, higher d increases e∗i because of higher peer eﬀects. On the other,
higher d decreases e∗i because of a higher chance to be caught. As a result, as can been seen
in (9), if the first eﬀect dominates the second one, then the relationship between d and e∗i is
positive.

3
3.1

Data and empirical strategy
Data

Our data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth),
which contains detailed information on a nationally representative sample of 90,118 students
in roughly 130 private and public schools, entering grades 7-12 in the 1994-1995 school year.17
AddHealth contains unique information on friendship relationships, which is crucial for our
analysis. The friendship information is based upon actual friends’ nominations. Pupils were
asked to identify their best friends from a school roster (up to five males and five females).18
A link exists between two friends if at least one of the two individuals has identified the
other as his/her best friend.19
Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of friendship networks in our sample by their
17

For a detailed description of the survey and data, see the AddHealth website at:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth.
18
The limit in the number of nominations is not binding, not even by gender. Less than 1 percent of the
students in our sample show a list of ten best friends, less than 3 percent a list of five males and roughly 4
percent name five females. On average, they declare to have 6.04 friends with a small dispersion around this
mean value (standard deviation equal to 1.32).
19
Note that, when an individual i identifies a best friend j who does not belong to the surveyed schools, the
database does not include j in the network of i; it provides no information about j. Fortunately, in the large
majority of cases (more than 93%), best friends tend to be in the same school and thus are systematically
included in the network.
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n. of networks

size (i.e. the number of network members).20 It appears that most friendship networks have
between 36 and 74 members The minimum number of friends in a network is 18, while the
maximum is 88. The average and the standard deviation of network size are 49.51 and 16.80.
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Figure 1. The empirical distribution of adolescent networks
By matching the identification numbers of the friendship nominations to respondents’
identification numbers, one can obtain information on the characteristics of nominated
friends.
Besides information on family background, school quality and area of residence, the
AddHealth contains sensitive data on sexual behavior (contraception, pregnancy, AIDS risk
perception), tobacco, alcohol, drugs and crime of a subset of adolescents. We use these data
to construct our dependent variable ei . Addhealth contains an extensive set of questions on
juvenile delinquency, ranging from light oﬀenses that only signal the propensity towards a
delinquent behavior to serious property and violent crime.21 Firstly, we adopt the standard
approach in the sociological literature to derive an index of delinquency involvement based
20

The histograms show on the horizontal axes the percentiles of the empirical distribution of network
component members corresponding to the percentages 1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 95, 100 and in the vertical
axes the number of networks having number of members between the i and i − 1 percentile.
21
Specifically, it contains information on 15 delinquency items. Namely, paint graﬃti or signs on someone
else’s property or in a public place; deliberately damage property that didn’t belong to you; lie to your parents
or guardians about where you had been or whom you were with; take something from a store without paying
for it; get into a serious physical fight; hurt someone badly enough to need bandages or care from a doctor
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on self-reported adolescents’ responses to a set of questions describing participation in a
series of criminal activities. The survey asks students how often they participate in each of
the diﬀerent activities during the past year.22 Each response is coded using an ordinal scale
ranging from 0 (i.e. never participate) to 1 (i.e. participate 1 or 2 times), 2 (participate
3 or 4 times) up to 3 (i.e. participate 5 or more times). On the basis on these variables,
a composite score is calculated for each respondent.23 The mean is 1.03, with considerable
variation around this value (the standard deviation is equal to 1.22). The Crombach−α
measure is then used to assess the quality of the derived index. In our case, we obtain an α
equal to 0.76 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) indicating that the diﬀerent items incorporated in the index have
considerable internal consistency. Secondly, in Section 4.2. we consider diﬀerent categories
of crime, which are chosen accordingly to the seriousness of the crime committed. Using
the corresponding information for nominated friends, we are able, for each individual i, to
calculate the average crime eﬀort ei of his/her peer group. Excluding the individuals with
missing or inadequate information, we obtain a final sample of 9,322 students distributed
over 166 networks.24

3.2

Empirical strategy

Guided by Proposition 2, our aim is to assess the actual empirical relationship between the
group criminal eﬀort ei and individual eﬀort level e∗i (comparative statics result (7)).
The main novel feature of our estimation with respect to previous works is the use of the
architecture of networks to evaluate peer eﬀects. Let us explain this more clearly.
Reflection problem In linear-in-means models, simultaneity in behavior of interacting
agents introduces a perfect collinearity between the expected mean outcome of the group
and its mean characteristics. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the eﬀect of
peers’ choice of eﬀort and peers’ characteristics that do impact on their eﬀort choice (the
so-called reflection problem; Manski, 1993). Basically, the reflection problem arises because,
or nurse; run away from home; drive a car without its owner’s permission; steal something worth more than
$50; go into a house or building to steal something; use or threaten to use a weapon to get something from
someone; sell marijuana or other drugs; steal something worth less than $50; take part in a fight where a
group of your friends was against another group; act loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place.
22
Respondents listened to pre-recorded questions through earphones and then they entered their answers
directly on laptop computers. This administration of the survey for sensitive topics minimizes the potential
for interview and parental influence, while maintaining data security.
23
This is a standard factor analysis, where the factor loadings of the diﬀerent variables are used to derive
the total score.
24
The networks include both criminals and noncriminals.
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in the standard approach, individuals interact in groups, that is individuals are aﬀected by
all individuals belonging to their group and by nobody outside the group. In other words,
groups do overlap. In the case of social networks, instead, this is nearly never true since the
reference group is the number of friends each individual has. So for example take individuals
P i
i and k such that gik = 1. Then, individual i is directly influenced by gi = nj=1
gij ej while
Pnk
individual k is directly influenced by gk = j=1 gkj ej , and there is little chance for these
two values to be the same unless the network is complete (i.e. everybody is linked with
everybody). Formally, social eﬀects are identified (i.e. no reflection problem) if G2 6= 0,
where G2 keeps track of indirect connections of length 2 in g.25 This condition guarantees
that I, G and G2 are linearly independent. G2 6= 0 means that there exist at least a path
of length 2 between two individuals.26 In other words, if i and j are friends and j and k
are friends, it does not necessarily imply that i and k are also friends. Even in linear-inmeans models, the Mansky’s (1993) reflection problem is thus eluded. These results are
formally derived in Bramoullé et al. (2009) (see, in particular Proposition 3) and used in
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009). Cohen-Cole (2006) presents a similar argument, i.e. the
use of out-group eﬀects, to achieve the identification of the endogenous group eﬀect in the
linear-in-means model (see also Weinberg et al., 2004; Lin, 2008; Laschever, 2009).
Endogenous network formation/correlated eﬀects Although this setting allows
us to solve the reflection problem, the estimation results might still be flawed because of
the presence of unobservable factors aﬀecting both individual and peer behavior. It is thus
diﬃcult to disentangle the endogenous peer eﬀects from the correlated eﬀects, i.e. from eﬀects
arising from the fact that individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because
they face a common environment. If individuals are not randomly assigned into groups,
this problem might originate from the possible sorting of agents. If the variables that drive
this process of selection are not fully observable, potential correlations between (unobserved)
group-specific factors and the target regressors are major sources of bias. In our case, two
types of possibly correlated eﬀects arise, i.e. at the network level and at the peer group level.
The use of network fixed eﬀects proves useful in this respect. Assume, indeed, that agents
self-select into diﬀerent networks in a first step, and that link formation takes place within
networks in a second step. Then, as Bramoullé et al. (2009) observe, if linking decisions are
uncorrelated with the observable variables, this two-step model of link formation generates
25

[2]

The coeﬃcient gij in the (i, j) cell of G2 gives the number of paths of length 2 in g between i and j.
26
It is extremely rare that in the real world the condition G2 6= 0 is not satisfied since it would basically
imply that all networks are complete. In our dataset, where 166 networks are considered (see above in the
data section), none of them are complete and all satisfy the condition that guarantees the identification of
social eﬀects.
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network fixed eﬀects. Assuming additively separable network heterogeneity, a within group
specification is able to control for these correlated eﬀects. In other words, we use a model
specification with a network-specific component of the error term, and adopt a traditional
(pseudo) panel data fixed eﬀects estimator, namely, we subtract from the individual-level
variables the network average.27
Observe that our particularly large information on individual (observed) variables should
reasonably explain the process of selection into groups. Then, the inclusion of network fixed
eﬀects acts as a further control for possible sorting eﬀects based on unobservables.
To document to what extent this approach accounts for self-selection in our case, we need
to provide evidence that (i) network-fixed eﬀects account for unobservable factors driving
the allocations of agents into networks and (ii) once observables and network-fixed eﬀects
are controlled for linking decisions are uncorrelated with peer-level observables. In other
words, (ii) should show that, conditional upon network fixed eﬀects, student and peer characteristics are orthogonal, thus indicating that peer group formation is random conditional
upon network.
We thus consider individual variables that are commonly believed to induce self-selection
into teenagers’ friendship groups and perform two diﬀerent exercises. Firstly, we estimate
the correlations between such individual-level variables and the network averages of the
residuals obtained from a regression analysis where the influence of a variety of other factors
(see Table A.1, Appendix 2 for a precise description of variables) and network-fixed eﬀects are
washed out. Secondly, we estimate the correlations between such individual-level variables
and peer-group averages (i.e., averages over best friends), once the influence of our extensive
set of controls and network-fixed eﬀects are washed out. The results are reported in Table
1 (in the second and third column, respectively).28 The estimated correlation coeﬃcients
27

Bramoullé et al. (2009) also deal with this problem in the context of networks. In their Proposition
5, they show that if the matrices I, G, G2 and G3 are linearly independent, then by subtracting from the
variables the network component average (or the average over neighbors, i.e. direct friends) social eﬀects
are again identified and one can disentangle endogenous eﬀects from correlated eﬀects. In our dataset this
condition of linear independence is always satisfied.
28
More formally, in the first exercise we estimate the OLS residuals from the equation:
yi,κ =

M
X

m=1

m
βm
1 xi,κ +

M nκ
1 XX

gi,κ

θm gij,κ xm
j,κ + η k + εik

(10)

m=1 j=1

where yi,k , is a given characteristic of individual i in network κ, xm
i,κ (for m = 1, ..., M ) is the set of M control
variables containing an extensive number of individual, family, school and residential area characteristics,
¢
Pnκ ¡
m
j=1 gij,κ xj,κ /gi,κ is the set of the average values of the M controls of i’s direct friends, η k denote
network-fixed eﬀects and εik the random error term . We then report in the first column of Table 1 the OLS
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are not statistically significant for all attributes considered in both columns. This indicates
that, in our case, (i) the particularly large information on individual (observed) variables
and (additively separable) unobserved network characteristics account for a possible sorting
of students into networks and (ii) conditionally on individual and network characteristics,
linking decisions are uncorrelated with observable variables.29
[Insert T able 1 here]
Correlated individual eﬀects Finally, one might question the presence of problematic unobservable factors that are nor network-specific nor peer-group-specific, but rather
individual-specific. In this respect, the richness of the information provided by the AddHealth
questionnaire on adolescents’ behavior allow us to find proxies for typically unobserved individual characteristics that may be correlated with our variable of interest. Specifically,
to control for diﬀerences in leadership propensity across adolescents we include an indicator
of self-esteem and an indicator of the level of physical development compared to the peers,
and we use mathematics score as an indicator of ability. Also, we attempt to capture diﬀerences in attitude towards education and parenting by including indicators of the student’s
motivation in education and parental care.
Correlated school eﬀects Similar arguments can be put forward for the existence of
possible correlations between our variable of interest and unobservable school characteristics
aﬀecting structure and/or quality of school-friendship networks in analyzing students’ school
performance. Because the AddHealth survey interviews all children within a school, we
estimate our model conditional on school fixed eﬀects (i.e. we incorporate in the estimation
school dummies). This approach enables us to capture the influence of school level inputs
(such as teachers and students quality, and possibly the parents’ residential choices), so that
only the variation in the average behavior of peers (across students in the same school) would
be exploited.30
estimates that are obtained when regressing yi,κ on the residuals b
εik averaged over networks. In the second
m
column, instead, we report the estimated θm s associated to xj,κ = yi,κ .
29
The architecture of social networks with non-overlapping groups also oﬀer the opportunity for IV estimation to control for peer-group correlated eﬀects. Since individual k ∈
/ gi , the characteristics of k do not
directly aﬀect ei (i’s outcome) but, since k ∈ gj , they aﬀect ej (j’s outcome), and since j ∈ gi , ej aﬀects
ei . As a result, the characteristics of k aﬀects ei only indirectly through its eﬀect on ej . This means that
the characteristics of k are a valid instrument to estimate the endogenous social eﬀect for ei . We experimented with diﬀerent sets of instruments (diﬀerent characteristics of excluded friends) but our results, i.e.
our estimates of peer eﬀects, remain always qualitatively unchanged.
30
Most of the times (but not always) school dummies coincide with network dummies. The introduction
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Deterrence eﬀects So far in this section, we have focused our attention on the main
purpose of our empirical analysis, which is to be found in the identification of peer eﬀects and
conformism in crime using the network architecture. The identification of deterrence eﬀects
(pf in our theoretical model) on crime is an equally diﬃcult empirical exercise because of the
well-known potential simultaneity and reverse causality issues (Levitt, 1997), which cannot
be totally solved using our network based empirical strategy. School dummies, however,
also account for diﬀerences in the strictness of anti-crime regulations across schools (i.e.
diﬀerences in the expected punishment for a student who is caught possessing illegal drug,
stealing school property, verbally abusing a teacher, etc.) as well as for diﬀerences in crime
policies at the local level (because schools are in diﬀerent areas). As a result, instead of
directly estimating deterrence eﬀects (i.e. to include in the model specification observable
measures of deterrence, such as local police expenditures or the arrest rate in the local
area), we focus our attention on the estimation of peer eﬀects in crime, accounting for
observable and unobservable school, and hence area-of-residence, variables (such as policing
practicing, ethnic concentration, low informal social control, lack of educational or economic
opportunities,etc....) that might be correlated with our variable of interest.
Assuming nκ individuals in each of the K networks in the economy, for i = 1, ..., nκ ,
κ = 1, ..., K, and using (3), the econometric counterpart of (6) is given by:
ei,κ

ni,κ
M
M nκ
X
1 X
1 XX
m m
=φ
gij,κ ej,κ +
β 1 xi,κ +
θm gij,κ xm
j,κ + η k + εik
gi,κ j=1
g
i,κ
m=1
m=1 j=1

(11)

where ei,k , is the index of criminality of individual i in network κ, xm
i,κ (for m = 1, ..., M) is
the set of M control variables containing an extensive number of individual, family, school
Pnκ
and residential area characteristics, gi,κ =
j=1 gij,κ is the number of direct links of i,
¢
Pnκ ¡
m
j=1 gij,κ xj,κ /gi,κ is the set of the average values of the M controls of i’s direct friends (i.e.
P
PM Pnκ
m m
1
m
contextual eﬀects). As stated in the theoretical model, M
β
x
+
i,κ
1
m=1
m=1
j=1 γ m gij,κ xj,κ
gi,κ
reflects the ex-ante idiosyncratic heterogeneity of each individual i and our measure of taste
for conformity or strength of peer eﬀects is captured by the parameter φ (in the theoretical
model φ = d/ (c + d)). To be more precise, φ = d/ (c + d) measures the taste for conformity
relative to the direct, time or psychological costs of crime (captured by the parameter c).
So if c were very small, φ would be positive and large even if the taste for conformity (d)
were very small. Finally, the error term consists of a network specific component (constant
over individuals in the same network), which might be correlated with the regressors, ηk ,
of student-grade or student-year of attendance dummies does not change qualitatively the results on our
target variable.
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and a white noise component, εik . A precise description of the variables included and the
corresponding descriptive statistics are contained in the Data Appendix to this paper (Table
A.1, Appendix 2).
Model (11) is the empirical equivalent of the first order conditions of our model of network
peer eﬀects given by (6) in Proposition 2. It is the so-called spatial lag model or mixedregressive spatial autoregressive model (Anselin, 1988) with the addition of a network-specific
component of the error term. Once the variables are transformed in deviations from the
network-specific means, a Maximum Likelihood approach (see, e.g. Anselin, 1988) allows us
b γ
b
b , and φ.
to estimate jointly β,

4

Empirical results

Testing the model The maximum likelihood estimation results of model (11) are reported
in the second column of Table 2 (“All crimes”).31 The table shows that the estimated
coeﬃcient of φ, which measures the taste for conformity, is statistically significant and has
a positive sign. Specifically, a one-standard deviation increase in individual i’s taste for
conformity or equivalently in the average criminal activity of individual i’s reference group
raises individual i’s level of crime by about 5.2 percent of a standard deviation. This evidence
supports our theoretical framework predicting a relevant role of peers and conformity to
peers’ behavior in shaping criminal activities among teenagers.
[Insert T able 2 here]
Diﬀerent types of crime The literature on local interactions has uncovered some
interesting diﬀerences between diﬀerent types of crime. For instance, Ludwig et al. (2000)
find that neighborhood eﬀects are large and negative for violent crime but have a mild
positive eﬀect on property crime. In contrast, Glaeser et al. (1996) find instead that social
interactions seem to have a large eﬀect on petty crime, a moderate eﬀect on more serious
crime and a negligible eﬀect on very violent crime.
The basic idea of our theoretical model is that agents’ criminal behavior is driven by their
desire to reduce the discrepancy between their own crime eﬀort and that of their reference
group (i.e. their best friends). We find that such a model is validated by our data for juvenile
crime as a whole.
31

When the model is estimated with an increasing set of controls (i.e. by adding the diﬀerent groups listed
b decreases, thus indicating we are capturing important confounding factors.
in Table A.1) the value of φ
However, the qualitative results remain unchanged. The complete list of estimation results are available
upon request.
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The richness of the information provided by the AddHealth data on juvenile crime enables
us also to test our conformism model for diﬀerent types of crime, thus making our analysis
directly comparable to previous works. Specifically, we analyze whether the magnitude of
the peer eﬀects depends on the type of crime committed. We split the oﬀences reported
in our data in three groups (with increasing costs of committing crime). The first group
(type-1 crimes) contains (i) to paint graﬃti or sign on someone else’s property or in a public
place; (ii) to lie to the parents or guardians about where or with whom having been; (iii)
to run away from home; (iv) to act loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place. The second
group (type-2 crimes) consists of (i) to get into a serious physical fight; (ii) to hurt someone
badly enough to need bandages or care from a doctor or nurse; (iii) to drive a car without
its owner’s permission; (iv) to steal something worth less than $50. The third group (type-3
crimes) encompasses (i) to take something from a store without paying for it; (ii) to steal
something worth more than $50; (iii) to go into a house or building to steal something; (iv)
to use or threat to use a weapon to get something from someone; (v) to sell marijuana or
other drugs. Less than 20 percent of the teenagers in our sample confess to have committed
the more serious oﬀences.32 To be precise, these three groups contain 3,488, 4,084 and 1,803
individuals respectively.
We estimate the following modified version of model (11):
ei,κ,l = αφl

ni,κ
X
j=1

gij,κ ej,κ +

M
X

β m xm
i,κ +

m=1

M nκ
1 XX
θm gij,κ xm
j,κ + η k + εi,k,l
gi,κ m=1 j=1

(12)

where ei,k,l is now the index of crime of type l committed by individual i in network κ,
and the rest of the notation defined for model (11) applies. The estimation of this model
provides type of crime-specific peer eﬀects. The results are contained in columns three,
four and five of Table 2. We find that the estimated coeﬃcient φl , which measures the
taste for conformity for type-l crime, remains always significant and positive whatever the
seriousness of the crime considered, but it decreases in magnitude when moving from light to
more serious crimes. A one-standard deviation increase in individual i’s taste for conformity
for type−1 crimes or equivalently a one-standard deviation increase in the average criminal
activity of individual i’s reference group translates roughly into a 9.8 percent decrease in
standard deviations of individual i’s criminal activity when petty crimes (type-1 crimes)
are considered, whereas this eﬀect amounts to 6.3 and only to 1.4 for intermediary (type-2
crimes) and serious crimes (type-3 crimes), respectively. This evidence is in line with the
32

Adolescents are selected in a more serious type of crime group if they have committed at least one of
the oﬀences considered in the group.
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findings of Glaeser et al. (1996) who show that social interactions are more important for
petty crimes.

5

Robustness check: Undirected vs directed networks

Our theoretical model and consequently our empirical investigation assume so far that friendship relationships are symmetric, i.e. gij,κ = gji,κ . In this Section, we check how sensitive
our results are to such an assumption, i.e. to a possible measurement error in the definition
of the peer group. Indeed, our data make it possible to know exactly who nominates whom
in a network and we find that 12 percent of relationships in our dataset are not reciprocal.
Instead of constructing undirected network, we will now focus on the analysis of directed
delinquent networks.
In the language of graph theory, in a directed graph, a link has two distinct ends: a
head (the end with an arrow) and a tail. Each end is counted separately. The sum of
head endpoints count toward the indegree and the sum of tail endpoints count toward the
outdegree. Formally, we denote a link from i to j as gij = 1 if j has nominated i as his/her
friend, and gij = 0, otherwise. The indegree of student i, denoted by gi+ , is the number of
P
nominations student i receives from other students, that is gi+ = j gij . The outdegree of
P
student i, denoted by gi− , is the number of friends student i nominates, that is gi− = j gji .
We can thus construct two types of directed networks, one based on indegrees and the other
based on outdegrees. Observe that, by definition, while in undirected networks the adjacency
matrix G = [gij ] is symmetric, in directed networks it is asymmetric.
From a theoretical point of view, it is easily verified that, in the proof of Propositions
1 and 2, the symmetry of G does not play any explicit role and thus all the results remain
valid with a non-symmetric G.
Turning to the empirical analysis, we report in Tables 3 and 4 the results of the estimation
of model (11) and of its modified version (12) when the directed nature of the network data
is taken into account. It appears that our results are only minimally aﬀected in both tables.
The estimated peer eﬀects remain positive and statistically significant. They are only slightly
lower in magnitude.
[Insert T ables 3 and 4 here]
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6

Conclusion and policy implications

In education, crime, smoking, teenage pregnancy, school dropout, etc. economists have
pointed out the importance of peer eﬀects in explaining these outcomes (see e.g. Glaeser and
Scheinkman, 2001). Understand the generating mechanism of such peer eﬀects is essential for
the interpretation of the findings and to provide policy guidance. We believe that conformity
is key element determining economic outcomes that involve interactions with peers. In the
present paper, we propose a model that explains how conformity and deterrence impact on
criminal activities. In particular, we find significant impact of peers on individual criminal
activity for individuals belonging to the same group of friends. We then test the model
using the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth), which contains unique detailed information on friendship relationships among delinquent teenagers. A
“reversion-to-the-group-mean” eﬀect is identified.
Our results suggest that, for teenagers, the decision to commit crime depends on the
seriousness of crime. In particular, for petty crimes, adolescents are strongly aﬀected by their
environment and peers because of externalities involved in social-decision making. In their
study of a gang located in a black inner-city neighborhood, Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) find
that “social/nonpecuniary factors are likely to play an important role” in criminal decisions
and gang activities. Here, even though we do not focus on gangs, we highlight one of these
social/nonpecuniary factors: the desire to conform to the group’s norm. Because of the
implications of juvenile crime for adolescent’s behavior in the future, an eﬀective policy
should not only be measured by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group
interactions it engenders.
To be more precise, if social interactions and conformism are crucial to understand juvenile criminal activities, then a targeted policy identifying “key players” (or “key groups
of players”) in a given area (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) may be an eﬀective way to reduce
crime. A key player (or a key group) is an individual (or a group of persons) belonging
to a network of criminals who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate delinquency
reduction. In practice, the planner may want to identify optimal network targets to concentrate (scarce) investigatory resources on some particular individuals, or to isolate them
from the rest of the group, either through leniency programs, social assistance programs, or
incarceration. The success of such policy depends on the ability to identify a social network
and this task may be not as diﬃcult as it seems to be. For instance, Haynie (2001) and the
present paper use friendship data to identify delinquent peer networks for adolescents in the
U.S. that participated in an in-school survey in the 1990’s. Sarnecki (2001) provides a com-
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prehensive study of co-oﬀending relations and corresponding network structure for football
hooligans and right-wing extremists in Stockholm. In all these cases, one may directly use
the available data to determine the key player or group players.
Social mixing policies, like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment (mentioned in
the Introduction), which relocates families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods, could
also be an eﬀective tool in breaking delinquent networks. Indeed, by moving “key” delinquents (or “key groups” of delinquents) from one area to another, this policy will disrupt the
communication and the links between delinquents in a given network. As a result, by using
together a key player (or a key group) policy and the MTO program, i.e. moving families
whose delinquents are “key” in a local network, would have a very eﬃcient eﬀect in reducing
crime because they move “key” delinquents to richer areas while breaking criminal networks
in poorer areas.
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Appendix 1: Proofs of propositions of the model
[k]

Proof of Proposition 1. First, observe that Γ is a stochastic matrix, that is γ ij ≥ 0
P [k]
and j γ ij = 1, and thus the largest egenvalue of Γ is 1, i.e. μ1 (Γ) = 1. Second, by plugging
(1) in (2) for the case bi = b, we obtain:
ui (ei , ei ) = a + b ei − p ei f − c e2i − d (ei − ei )2
⎡
⎤2
j=ni (g)
X
= a + b ei − p ei f − c e2i − d ⎣ei −
γ ij ej ⎦
j=1

⎡

⎤2

j=ni (g)

= a−d ⎣

X
j=1

γ ij ej ⎦ + (b − p f) ei − (c + d) e2i + 2d

j=ni (g)

X

γ ij ei ej

j=1

Now, assuming b > p f , we can apply Theorem 1 of Ballester et al. (2006)33 with α = b −p f ,
β = 2 (c + d), γ = 034 and λ = 2d. Hence, the condition for existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium can be written as: 2(c + d) > 2d, which is always satisfied since c > 0.
Third, let us calculate the Bonacich vector. By definition,
X
η i (φ, γ) = mii (γ, φ) +
mij (γ, φ)
j6=i

n
X

= φ

j=1

=

+∞
X

n
X
[k]
γ ij + ... + φ
γ ij + ...
k

j=1

φk

j=1

Pn
Pn [k]
since Γ, Γ1 ,..., Γk , ... are stochastic matrices and thus j=1 γ ij = ... = j=1 γ ij = 1. As a
result,
+∞
X
1
ηi (φ, γ) =
φk =
1−φ
j=1

Applying again Theorem 1 in Ballester et al. (2006), where φ = d/(c + d), our Nash
equilibrium is given by:
⎛ b−p f ⎞
2c

⎟
⎜
e = ⎝ ... ⎠
∗

b−p f
2c

hP
i2
j=ni (g)
Observe that the term a − d
γ
e
does not matter since the derivative of this term with
j
ij
j=1
respect to ei is equal to zero.
34
This is the γ in Ballester et al. (2006).
33
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This implies that e∗ = e∗ and thus all players provide the same eﬀort level (b − pf ) / (2c).
Proof of Proposition 2. First, observe that Γ is a stochastic matrix (γ ij ≥ 0 and
j γ ij = 1) and thus its largest egenvalue is 1, i.e. μ1 (Γ) = 1. Second, as for the proof of
Proposition 1, we have:

P

ui (ei , ei ) = a + bi ei − p ei f − c e2i − di (ei − ei )2
" j=n
#2
j=n
X
X
2
= a − di
γ ij ej + (bi − p f ) ei − (c + di ) ei + 2di
γ ij ei ej
j=1

j=1

Assume that bi > p f for all i. The utility function is nearly the same as the one in Ballester
et al. (2006)35 where αi = bi −p f , β = 2 (c + d), γ = 036 and λ = 2di . The main diﬀerence is
that we now have ex ante heterogeneity because of αi . However, because γ = 0 (i.e. there is
no global substituability), the condition for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
is still given by β > γμ1 (Γ),37 which in our case is equivalent to: 2(ci + d) > 2d for each i.
This is always satisfied since ci > 0 for all i. Third, (6) is just the first order condition for
each individual i.

hP
i2
j=ni (g)
Observe that the term a − d
γ
e
does not matter since the derivative of this term with
j
ij
j=1
respect to ei is equal to zero.
36
This is the γ in Ballester et al. (2006).
37
See Ballester and Calvó-Armengol (2006).
35
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Appendix 2: Data appendix
Table A.1: Description of Data (9,322 individuals, 166 networks)
Variable definition
Delinquency index
Delinquency index of best friends
Delinquency index (type-1 crime)
Delinquency index (type-2 crime)
Delinquency index (type-3 crime)
Individual socio-demographic variables
Female
Age
Health status

Religion practice

Black or African American
Other races
School attendance
Student grade
Mathematics score
Organized social participation

Motivation in education

Physical development

Self esteem

Mean

St.dev

Min

Max

In the text
Average value of the delinquency
index over direct friends.
In the text
In the text
In the text

1.03
1.01

1.22
1.04

0
0

3
3

1.66
0.98
0.59

1.15
0.78
0.33

0
0
0

3
3
3

Dummy variable taking value one
if the respondent is female.
Respondents' age measured in
years.
Response to the question "In the
last month, how often did a health
or emotional problem cause you to
miss a day of school", coded as 0=
never, 1=just a few times, 2= about
once a week, 3= almost every day,
4= every day.
Response to the question: "In the
past 12 months, how often did you
attend religious services", coded as
1= never, 2= less than once a
month, 3= once a month or more,
but less than once a week, 4= once
a week or more.
Race dummies. “White” is the
reference group.
“
Number or years the respondent has
been a student at the school.
Grade of student in the current
year.
Score in mathematics at the most
recent grading period, coded as1=
D or lower, 2= C, 3=B, 4=A.
Dummy taking value one if the
respondent participates in any
clubs, organizations, or teams at
school in the school year.
Dummy taking value one if the
respondent reports to try very hard
to do his/her school work well,
coded as 1=I never try at all, 2=I
don't try very hard, 3=I try hard
enough, but not as hard as I could,
4=I try very hard to do my best.
Response to the question: "How
advanced is your physical
development compared to other
boys your age", coded as 1= I look
younger than most, 2= I look
younger than some, 3= I look about
average, 4= I look older than some,
5= I look older than most
Response to the question:
"Compared with other people your
age, how intelligent are you", coded
as 1= moderately below average,
2= slightly below average, 3= about
average, 4= slightly above average,
5= moderately above average, 6=
extremely above average.

0.40

0.34

0

1

15.25

1.85

10

19

3.03

1.74

0

4

2.69

0.78

1

4

0.20

0.31

0

1

0.10
3.29

0.13
1.86

0
1

1
6

9.24

3.14

6

13

1.94

1.31

1

4

0.65

0.20

0

1

2.24

0.88

1

4

3.12

2.51

1

5

3.93

1.37

1

6

3.50

1.73

1

6

0.42

0.57

0

1

0.22

0.43

0

1

Family background variables
Household size
Two married parent family

Single parent family
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper448

Number of people living in the
household.
Dummy taking value one if the
respondent lives in a household
with two parents (both biological
and non biological) that are
married.
Dummy taking value one if the
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Public assistance:
Mother working
Parent education

Parents age
Parent occupation manager

Parent occupation professional/technical
Parent occupation office or sales worker
Parent occupation manual
Parent occupation military or security
Parent occupation farm or fishery
Parent occupation retired
Parent occupation other
Protective factors
Relationship with teachers

Social exclusion

School attachment

Parental care

respondent lives in a household
with only one parent (both
biological and non biological).
Dummy taking value one if either
the father or the mother receives
public assistance, such as welfare.
Dummy taking value one if the
mother works for pay.
Schooling level of the (biological
or non-biological) parent who is
living with the child, distinguishing
between "never went to school",
"not graduate from high school",
"high school graduate", "graduated
from college or a university",
"professional training beyond a
four-year college", coded as 1 to 5.
We considering only the education
of the father if both parents are in
the household.
Mean value of the age (years) of
the parents (biological or nonbiological) living with the child.
Parent occupation dummies.
Closest description of the job of
(biological or non-biological)
parent that is living with the child is
manager. If both parents are in the
household, the occupation of the
father is considered. “Doesn't work
without being disables” is the
reference group
”
”
”
”
”
”
”

0.12

0.16

0

1

0.64

0.45

0

1

3.58

2.08

1

5

40.14

13.64

33

75

0.11

0.13

0

1

0.09
0.25
0.21
0.08
0.04
0.06
0.13

0.22
0.29
0.30
0.12
0.09
0.10
0.17

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Dummy taking value one if the
respondent reports to have trouble
getting along with teachers at least
about once a week, since the
beginning of the school year.
Response to the question: "How
much do you feel that adults care
about you, coded as 1= very much,
2= quite a bit, 3= somewhat, 4=
very little, 5= not at all
Composite score of three items
derived from the questions: "How
much do you agree or disagree that:
(a) You feel close to people at your
school, (b) you feel like you are
part of your school, (c) you are
happy to be at your school", all
coded as 1= strongly agree, 2=
agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree,
4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree.
(Crombach-alpha =0.75).
Dummy taking value one if the
respondent reports that the
(biological or non-biological)
parent that is living with her/him or
at least one of the parents if both
are in the household cares very
much about her/him

0.15

0.35

0

1

2.26

1.80

1

5

2.57

1.75

1

5

0.65

0.35

0

1

Interviewer response to the
question "How well kept is the
building in which the respondent
lives", coded as 1= very poorly kept
(needs major repairs), 2= poorly
kept (needs minor repairs), 3=
fairly well kept (needs cosmetic
work), 4= very well kept.
Dummy variable taking value if the
interviewer felt concerned for

2.96

1.85

1

4

0.52

0.57

0

1

Residential neighborhood variables
Residential building quality

Neighborhood safety
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Residential area suburban

Residential area urban - residential only
Residential area industrial properties
- mostly wholesale
Residential area other type
Contextual effects

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper448

his/her safety when he/she went to
the respondent's home.
Residential area type dummies:
interviewer's description of the
immediate area or street (one block,
both sides) where the respondent
lives. “Rural area” is the reference
group.
”
”
”
Average values of all the control
variables over the respondent's
direct friends (peer-group
characteristics).

0.32

0.39

0

1

0.18
0.13

0.21
0.18

0
0

1
1

0.19

0.25

0

1
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Table 1: Correlation between individual, network and peer group-level variables
Individual variables

correlation with

correlation with

network averaged residuals

peer-group averaged variables

−0.1996

0.0725

Parental education
Parental care

(0.3417)

(0.1198)

0.1562

−0.1662

(0.1631)

(0.2217)

Mathematics score

−0.1819
(0.2042)

(0.0755)

Motivation in education

−0.0896

0.1546

School attachment
Social exclusion

0.0699

(0.2577)

(0.1869)

0.0725

0.0499

(0.0993)

(0.0763)

0.0317

−0.0901

(0.0341)

(0.1008)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

Protective factors

yes

yes

Residential neighborhood variables

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

School dummies

yes

yes

Network fixed eﬀects

yes

yes

Notes:
- OLS estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- The model specification is detailed in the text (footnote 22).

- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

- None of the coeﬃcients is statistically significant at any conventional level
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: delinquency index
All crimes

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

0.0612∗∗
(0.0305)

0.0688∗∗
(0.0320)

0.0499∗∗
(0.0241)

0.0079∗∗
(0.0035)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Protective factors

yes

yes

yes

yes

Residential neighborhood variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

School dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

Network fixed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

0.4766

0.4915

0.4111

0.4599

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2
Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗

indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: delinquency index
- Directed networks using indegreesAll crimes

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

0.0565∗∗
(0.0279)

0.0612∗∗
(0.0283)

0.0451∗∗
(0.0206)

0.0067∗∗
(0.0034)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Protective factors

yes

yes

yes

yes

Residential neighborhood variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

School dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

Network fixed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

0.4529

0.4801

0.4001

0.4455

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2
Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗

indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimation results
Dependent variable: delinquency index
- Directed networks using outdegreesAll crimes

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

0.0609∗∗∗
(0.0216)

0.0669∗∗
(0.0290)

0.0472∗∗
(0.0203)

0.0070∗∗
(0.0031)

Individual socio-demographic variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Family background variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Protective factors

yes

yes

yes

yes

Residential neighborhood variables

yes

yes

yes

yes

Contextual eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

School dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

Network fixed eﬀects

yes

yes

yes

yes

0.4790

0.5088

0.4215

0.4633

Variable
Conformism / peer eﬀects (φ)

pseudo-R2
Notes:

- Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported
- Estimation using SpaceStat v1.93 (Anselin, 1995).
- Control variables are those listed in Table A.1
- Regressions include weights to control for the AddHealth survey design

-

∗∗

indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level
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